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Abstract
Cybersecurity sits at the intersection of public security concerns about critical infrastructure protection and private secu-
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has been less effective in reflecting on the role of cybersecurity in the broader constitution of political order. Unpacking
three accepted conceptual divisions between public and private, state and market, and the political and economic, it is
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at another level in the organization of political economy of liberal democratic societies.
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1. Introduction
The politics of infrastructure are central to the gover-
nance of modern societies. Large Technical Systems (LTS)
shape all aspects of our everyday lives, in ways both visi-
ble and hidden. The ubiquity of infrastructures and their
capacity tomediate relations between different social ac-
tors demand careful analytical attention and the develop-
ment of conceptual frameworks appropriate to capture
the complex social, political and economic processes that
drive their development and reproduction. As a practi-
cal political issue this task is important; clarifying where
the power to shape modern life lies is central to under-
standing how our world is made, illuminating issues of
political and moral responsibility that surround the poli-
tics of technology.
As this thematic issuemakes clear, studies of cyberse-
curity require further theoretical and conceptual ground-
clearing to produce these insights. By and large, the lit-
erature on critical infrastructure protection and cyber-
security has remained within a problem-solving frame-
work, in which the existing social order forms the back-
ground premises within which a problem is posed (Cox,
1981; Dunn Cavelty, 2013, p. 106). The provision of cyber-
security has been studied within a relatively narrow set
of assumptions, with questions central to security stud-
ies, and politics more broadly, circumscribed. This is par-
ticularly evident in the literature on public-private part-
nerships (PPPs) as a route to the provision of cybersecu-
rity in liberal democracies. Building on an emerging lit-
erature that seeks to sharpen the analytical focus of an
often vague or underspecified set of issues (Carr, 2016;
Dunn Cavelty, 2014), the starting point for this article is a
rather simple question: what is cybersecurity and critical
infrastructure protection for?
Answering this question, while not straightforward,
can be clarified by problematising a set of common-
sense assumptions apparent within studies of PPPs
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about how political life can and should be organized. The
literature on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure pro-
tection needs to be theoretically ‘deepened’ to clarify a
broader grasp of what cybersecurity is for, and to high-
light potential political alternatives. Considering what cy-
bersecurity is for requiresmoving beyond a narrow issue-
specific focus to consider how cybersecurity practices re-
late to existing social formations. To foreshadow the ar-
gument developed below, the central move in this arti-
cle is an interrogation of the conceptual separation of
the political and the economic, and its related binaries
of public/private and state/market, in the field of cyber-
security. Once we being to question the seeming natural-
ness of this divide it becomes possible to articulate the
wider stakes of cybersecurity with greater clarity.
This article will proceed as follows. First, it will set
out the dominant approach that views cybersecurity as
a public good, and thereby frames its provision as a col-
lective action problem. The United States will serve as
the empirical referent point. Understood in these terms,
everyone benefits from cybersecurity. Second, it will dis-
cuss the conceptual binaries, noted above, that form the
starting point for these analyses. These sections will dis-
cuss how the assumption of state autonomy in collec-
tive action models underpins the conceptual divisions
between public and private, state and market, and pol-
itics and economics. Schematic in nature, these sections
nevertheless draw attention to a series of problematic
theoretical assumptions around these binaries. Finally, it
will argue that assuming a division between these var-
ious spheres of social life obscures the role of PPPs in
(re)producing the specific forms of liberal political order.
PPPs are a method of collaboration designed to repro-
duce the privatization of political power that character-
izes modern liberal capitalist society. This article thereby
contributes a growing literature seeking to clarify how
relations of power and accountability operate in cyber-
security PPPs, outlining the limits liberalism itself sets on
making certain forms of social power accountable.
2. Public-Private Partnerships, Public Goods, and
Problem Solving Theories
Provision of security, physical or otherwise, is classically
the function of the state. Whether applied to national
security or domestic policing, in modern liberal capitalist
societies it is the state that has been tasked to carry out
these duties. So central is the state to the provision of se-
curity that the shift away from this liberal norm, evident
in the greater use of private military and security con-
tractors (PMSCs) globally, has generated substantial an-
alytical and political attention (Abrahamsen & Williams,
2010; Avant, 2005). Privatizing the provision of security
has generated concern around private firms’ potential
conflicts of interests, with PMSCs accountable to both
public authorities and their shareholders.
Cybersecurity, by contrast, does not centre on the pri-
vatization of existing security functions. Concerns about
the outsourcing of cybersecurity are largely misplaced;
states are not contracting out security functions to the
private sector, and thus security is not being privatized
in the same manner as it is for other security issues
(Eichensehr, 2017, pp. 471–473; cf. Carr, 2016). Cyber-
security and critical infrastructure protection policies at-
tempt to secure infrastructures owned by both the pub-
lic and private sectors. The objects of protection in this
space—from critical infrastructures to information and
data—are overwhelmingly in private hands, with over
90% of critical infrastructures in the United States owned
by the private sector (Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 19).
This includes hardware and software infrastructures as
they extend inside the homes of ordinary Americans; cur-
rent estimates place internet penetration rates at 88%,
an indication of how broadly the problem of cybersecu-
rity extends (Pew Research Center, 2017). Cybersecurity
requires private citizens, corporations, and the state to
contribute to the provision of security for the networks
on which they depend. Indeed, successive American ad-
ministrations have stressed this point, emphasizing the
need for ‘awareness raising’ to promote better ‘cyber hy-
giene’, using public health metaphors to emphasize the
shared nature of the challenge (Stevens & Betz, 2013;
United States Department of Homeland Security, 2017).
Cybersecurity, like national security more broadly,
thereby appears to have the character of a public good:
it is non-rivalrous and non-excludable (Assaf, 2008, p. 13;
Shore, Du, & Zeadally, 2011). Rational choice approaches
to politics suggest that public goods should be provided
by the state, as private actors incentive structure pushes
them to free ride, inducing market failure. However,
state provision of cybersecurity is not a straightforward
option. Dunn Cavelty and Suter (2009, p. 179) high-
light the contradictions at the heart of critical infrastruc-
ture protection:
[Privatization policies] have put a large part of the crit-
ical infrastructure in the hands of private enterprise.
This creates a situation in which market forces alone
are not sufficient to provide security in most of the
CI [Critical Infrastructure] ‘sectors’. At the same time,
the state is incapable of providing the public good of
security on its own, since overly intrusive market in-
tervention is not a valid option either; the same in-
frastructures that the state aims to protect due to na-
tional security considerations are also the foundation
of the competitiveness and prosperity of a nation.
The problem for governments is how to provide the pub-
lic good of cybersecurity in a context in which interven-
tion in economic decision-making presents its own dis-
tinct risks. Caught between the Scylla of market failure
in cybersecurity provision and the Charybdis of state
planning, policymakers face a difficult decision: too lit-
tle intervention and the required public good will not
be provided; but too much and other facets of national
security are undermined. Navigating these dilemmas is
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thereby understood as the central political task faced
by policymakers.
PPPs present themselves as an effective middle way,
allowing the state to engage in ex ante decisions regard-
ing cybersecurity outcomes in careful consultation with
the private sector. This combination of planning with
market-led flexibility is embraced by policymakers as a
central rationale for promoting PPPs (United States Na-
tional Science and Technology Council, 2011). While co-
operation is not straightforward, there are shared inter-
ests at work here, even if the precise motivations behind
those interests are distinct. As Eichensehr notes, cooper-
ation allows government to control public expenditure
costs and avoid private sector interference with crucial
state functions, while helping the private sector secure
its intellectual property and, relatedly, its business repu-
tation (Carr, 2016, p. 55; Eichensehr, 2017, pp. 500–504).
The devil is, of course, in the details.Working out how
to make these partnerships function effectively, both in
the United States and elsewhere, has been the focus of
sustained analysis (Carr, 2016; Givens & Busch, 2013;
Harknett & Stever, 2011). Analysis revolves around de-
termining the institutional forms, policy processes, and
levels of state intervention through which PPPs canmost
effectively provide security. These problems have been
largely (but not exclusively) understood as collective ac-
tion problems—everyone has an interest in the provi-
sion of cybersecurity, but everyone also has an incen-
tive to free ride if possible. Solutions to these problems
seek ways to alter these incentive structures through,
for instance, institutions designed to share information,
such as the United States Department of Homeland
Security’s Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration
Programme (CISCP), or via the creation of trust build-
ing mechanisms between firms and between firms and
the state.
Practical and normative questions are inevitably
raised when considering PPPs in cybersecurity, in keep-
ing with the broader literature on PPPs (Brinkerhoff &
Brinkerhoff, 2011; Linder, 1999). Defining the scope of
private sector authority and responsibility for cybersecu-
rity, particularly as it impacts upon other aspects of na-
tional security such as intelligence collection, has gener-
ated both policy-centred proposals, such as those noted
above, and more abstract reflection on the appropri-
ate level of political authority assumed by private actors.
Practically, it has involved attempts to parse apart the re-
sponsibilities of different sets of cybersecurity actors in
order to develop clear rules around the scope of respon-
sibility for the public and private sector. Understanding
who has power to affect change, and how this occurs, is
important for this task.
Normative discussion has focused upon issues of po-
litical authority and accountability. This last aspect be-
gins to hint at the larger political issues posed by PPPs as
a solution to cybersecurity provision. Carr (2016, p. 60)
notes that ‘If responsibility and accountability can be de-
volved to private actors, the central principle that polit-
ical leaders and governments are held to account is un-
dermined’. Aswith the literature on PMSCs, concern over
the conflicting interests of private firms has led analysts
to caution against any easy recourse to market-led cyber-
security frameworks (Assaf, 2008; Carr, 2016, p. 62). Mul-
tiple lines of accountability may, it is suggested, under-
mine the responsiveness of PPPs to the public.
Steps in this direction are important to deepening
the study of cybersecurity. Yet, to date, this not resulted
in consideration of how cybersecurity policies relate to
political order. Questions of where political responsibil-
ity can and should lie—with the state, the private sec-
tor, or a combination of these—are constituted by the
specific institutional order of modern liberal capitalism
and its attendant social imaginaries. Accepting a series
of divisions between the private and the public, the state
and the market, and the political and the economic lim-
its our view of how these options are produced and re-
produced. Achieving a more holistic view of the relation-
ship between cybersecurity practices and political order
requires ‘deepening’ our approach to cybersecurity. It is
to this task that we now turn.
3. Security for Whom? Deepening Cybersecurity
Studies
Often confused with a ‘levels-of-analysis’ problem, in
which identifying the object of security as either the in-
dividual, state, or international system is the central fo-
cus, deepening security studies requires embedding the
study of securitywithin amore fundamental political the-
ory, from which concerns about ‘security’ and its opera-
tion are derived (Booth, 2007, p. 157). In Booth’s (2007,
p. 155) terms, ‘Deepening, therefore,means understand-
ing security as an epiphenomenon, and so accepting the
task of drilling down to explore its origins in the most
basic question of political theory’. Drilling down in this
context requires that we examine the fundamental as-
sumptions about politics as they exist in the literature
on PPPs in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure pro-
tection. Three conceptual divisions structure this litera-
ture and its subsequent analysis of cybersecurity: (1) the
distinction between the public and private and subse-
quently, (2) between states and markets; (3) the division
between public political power and private economic
power generated by the separation of the political and
the economic in liberal capitalist societies.
First, and most obviously, the literature on PPPs and
critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity ac-
cepts, as its analytical starting point, the division be-
tween the public and the private in liberal societies.
Viewing PPPs as requisite to grapple with complex gov-
ernance challenges has been described as a ‘truism’
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011, p. 2). Like most tru-
isms, however, it is revealing for the truth-conditions
it contains. For the most part the nature of this divide,
its historical constitution, and the role that it plays in
structuring an historically specific form of political or-
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der are not considered.1 This is not to suggest that the
shifting divides between greater public or greater pri-
vate involvement in the management of critical infras-
tructure and information technologies is ignored. Privati-
zation of telecommunications and critical infrastructure
protection often forms the background to analysis of the
present (e.g. Carr, 2016; Dunn Cavelty, 2013). This offers
an important insight, one ignored in themost straightfor-
ward problem solving approaches. Nevertheless, these
potted histories trace vacillations in the scope of pub-
lic or private governance, not the constitution of these
divisions as they are embedded within liberal order as
such. Taking the existing division between the public and
the private as given, much of the cybersecurity litera-
ture treats the public-private divide in the register of
problem-solving theory, in Cox’s (1981, p. 129) sense:
it takes the world as it is and seeks to make it work as
smoothly as possible. This allows for a fine-grained anal-
ysis of specific problems, as this literature has demon-
strated, but at the cost of a more holistic considera-
tion of how cybersecurity policies relate to, and help
(re)produce, forms of political order writ large.
In conceptualizing cybersecurity and critical infras-
tructure protection as a public good the analytical accep-
tance of the division between the public and the private
is already operative. This becomes apparent when we
consider how the state is viewed in these frameworks.
Analyses of PPPs, particularly those derived from a ra-
tional choice perspective, often treat the state as a uni-
tary actor (Christensen & Petersen, 2017; Dunn Cavelty
& Suter, 2009, p. 181; cf. Givens & Busch, 2013). Seem-
ingly innocuous, conceptualizing the state as a unitary ac-
tor carries with it a series of analytical implications. First,
the state is distinguished from other actors in, for exam-
ple, American society; it is one actor among a field of ac-
tors, each with their own aims and purposes.2 The state
and other actors in civil society thereby appear to be ex-
ternally related to each other; as we shall see, this un-
derstanding of the state can only partially grasp the re-
lationship between states and markets. Second, suggest-
ing that there are clearly defined boundaries between
state and society implies that the interests of the state
are derived from its position as a state as such, rather
than from its embeddedness within a society whose so-
cial forces shapes it policies.
This view of state and society makes it difficult to
understand the purposes of cybersecurity PPPs. Treat-
ing the state as distinct from society lends itself to func-
tionalist treatments. Functionalism portrays the aims of
state policy as pre-given by its social function; the pur-
pose of the state is to provide the conditions for the re-
production of social order. In the literature on PPPs the
state is assumed to play this functional role in social or-
ganization in that its purpose is to provide public goods.
That is, the role of the state is the generic provision of
public goods, to the benefit of society as a whole (Dunn
Cavelty, 2014; cf. Carnoy, 1984, pp. 39–40; Olson, 1971,
pp. 98–102). Whereas other concepts of the state, such
as instrumental or institutional approaches, view state
policy as the product of struggles between competing
interest groups, in functionalist approaches the security
aims of the state are assumed a priori. Christensen and
Petersen (2017, p. 1437), argue that ‘Since its forma-
tion, the nation-state has been considered responsible
for the provision of national security: the protection of
national borders and the maintenance of internal order’.
Similarly, Carr (2016, p. 62), focuses on the effectiveness
and limits of PPPs in providing national security as such.
From this starting point, one can outline better or worse
ways for the state to achieve its generic aims of cyber-
security, but the substantive social content of this end-
point is less clear.
This is a thin understanding of cybersecurity, in which
a generic goal—national security—is emptied of substan-
tive content: what kind of internal order is sought? To
whose benefit, or cost, within that society? Answering
these questions entails a substantive analysis of the form
and content of political order that are being secured. As
Michael C. Williams notes, the separation of the pub-
lic from the private is central to the modernist project
of liberal societies (2011). It sets out both the publicly
contestable terrain of politics and the private terrain in
which decisions can be taken without the input of the
state or the wider community. The institutional division
between public and private within liberal order is de-
signed to preserve a private sphere of liberty and to pre-
vent violence over the most contested political, moral,
and religious values by removing them from public con-
testation. A functionalist role for the state, inwhich it pro-
vides security in as ‘thin’ amanner as possible, its neutral-
ity allowing for political pluralism, is part of the conscious
project of liberalism. In these terms, state functions can
be judged as more or less effective, but only because the
purpose of the state has been set.
The divide between the public and the private sets
out the scope of accountability in liberal societies, deter-
mining which issues and actors may be held accountable
and to whom. Cybersecurity PPPs, which blur the lines
between the public and the private, are problematic pre-
cisely because they appear to undermine the neutrality
of the state in the provision of security as a public good.
PPPs do not, then,merely solve problems of efficient gov-
ernance. While the state is nominally considered to be
accountable to the public, PPPs represent an encroach-
ment of private unaccountability into the public sphere.
Understood in these terms, questions around account-
ability in PPPs touch upon the heart of liberal political
order itself.
1 Forrer, Kee, Newcomer and Boyer (2010, p. 475) suggest that PPPs date back to the Roman Empire. Similarly, Wettenhall (2003, as cited in Carr, 2016,
pp. 48–49), has asserted that PPPs date back to biblical times, and, at the very least, to the era of British privateers fighting against the Spanish in the
late 16th century. These historical claims are anachronistic, and obscure questions around the role of PPPs in contemporary political ordering.
2 This view is not uniform—Eichensehr (2017) treats state managers as possessing their own set of interests, akin to Weberian state theory.
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4. Cybersecurity, States and Markets, and Property
Rights
If the division between the public and the private, and
the subsequent appearance of the state as autonomous
from civil society and themarket, is an ongoing historical
product, it is important to understand how this division
is produced and maintained. Maintaining that the state
itself, as an actor, reproduces this separation assumes
what needs to be explained. To avoid hypostatizing the
state, and the public-private divide that liberal states ac-
tively constitute, requires engaging concepts of the state
that can grasp the historically concrete process whereby
state policy is shaped by domestic interest groups. This
allows us to study the particularity of different states and
how they are formed, rather than treating the state as an
entity with naturally given functions.
States are not naturally liberal, of course, but re-
quire that the social forces that dominate the state are
themselves liberal and shape the state to perform this
role, as opposed to potential alternative roles. A range
of work in security studies and International Relations,
from a variety of perspectives, has stressed the cen-
tral importance of domestic social forces in constituting
the national security interests of states (Homolar, 2010;
Moravcsik, 1997, p. 518, passim; Teschke, 2003). In con-
trast to the public goods approach, the state in this work
is viewed as an institution that mediates between differ-
ent social forces within society (Jessop, 2008). State form
is not neutral; instead, the form of the state shapes po-
litical outcomes, favouring the interests of some actors
over others. Rather than merely occupying a sphere de-
noted as ‘public’, state power, operationalized by differ-
ent groups in civil society, constitutes this division in the
first place. Liberal states are liberal because liberalsmake
them this way.
Understood in these terms, the idea that the state
provides neutral public goods, or that states and firms or
markets can be considered as separate without difficulty,
becomes tricky. Viewing the state as an institution draws
attention to the various interest groups that occupy the
state apparatuses. Analytically, political struggles that fo-
cus on controlling the apparatus of the state to realize
the distinct aims of different interest groups are brought
into relief, with the distinct political strategies the form
of the state enables clarified. Furthermore, viewing the
state as an institution highlights how the state and mar-
ket are not opposed to each other. Instead, liberal state
institutions are used to create the conditions for themar-
ket to operate. A range of tasks, such as protecting and
enforcing property rights, providing basic research and
development for technological innovation, and correct-
ing market-failures when they arise, as in the provision
of cybersecurity, are undertaken because specific inter-
est groups that control the state apparatus view these
policies as valuable, necessary or desirable. To give one
example, there was a clear distinction between the view
of state intervention into the field of cybersecurity pro-
vision between the Bush and Obama administrations.
The Bush administration viewed public intervention into
private markets as inevitably disruptive and inefficient;
by contrast, the Obama administration, with its differ-
ent political constituency and worldview, supported a
strong role for the state in organizing critical infrastruc-
ture protection and cybersecurity. Similarly, while the
private sector is often treated in uniform terms in the
literature, there are divisions and distinctions between
them, as illustrated in the Net Neutrality debates that of-
ten pitted telecommunications companies against soft-
ware providers. Which set of policies the state pursues is
shaped by which of these interest groups can use state
power to enact its political strategies.
How cybersecurity PPPs seek to maintain liberal po-
litical order, and where along the spectrum of possible
divisions of responsibility between public and private cy-
bersecurity policy ultimately lies, is determined by the
shifting control of the state by domestic interests. Liber-
als fearful of the growth of unaccountable power may
draw this line differently than those focused on economic
growth powered by unfettered markets. For our pur-
poses, the central point is that, while cybersecurity PPPs
blur the public-private distinction at the level of security
provision, they seek to maintain this in the wider politi-
cal order. They represent one political strategy to solve
the problem of cybersecurity, shaped by the liberal form
of the state and liberal social forces.3 In concrete terms,
PPPs aim to reproduce existing liberal political order by se-
curing central institutional features of liberal capitalist so-
cieties, such as the protection intellectual property rights
(IPRs). William Lynn III (2010), echoing United States gov-
ernment policy, highlights intellectual property theft as
the most significant cybersecurity threat
Although the threat to intellectual property is less dra-
matic than the threat to critical national infrastruc-
ture, it may be the most significant cyberthreat that
the United States will face over the long term….Asmil-
itary strength ultimately depends on economic vital-
ity, sustained intellectual property losses could erode
both the United States’ military effectiveness and its
competitiveness in the global economy.
The protection of IPRs is linked here to the provision of
national security, but of a specific kind, in which the pub-
lic sphere of the state is differentiated from the private
sphere of the market via the political institution of prop-
erty. State-coordinated programs of information sharing
about threats and intrusions aim to combat threats to
the integrity of property rights. PPPs involve the coop-
eration of the public and private sectors, or the state
and the market, but this blurs the separation of these
spheres only at the issue specific level of security provi-
3 Comparison to non-liberal states makes this clear—non-liberal states do not face the same set of contradictions generated by PPPs in the United States
or the United Kingdom (Carr, 2016, p. 62).
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sion. Viewed holistically, the protection of IPRs through
PPPs operates to secure these divides in the wider so-
cial formation.
Thus, while critical infrastructure protection once re-
ferred to publicly-owned and operated infrastructures,
such as power plants orwaterworks, it increasingly refers
to private infrastructures (Aradau, 2010, p. 507). Dunn
Cavelty has noted that (2014, p. 707) cybersecurity and
critical infrastructure protection secures a wider political
economy that distributes economic benefits unequally:
‘It is not a given, then, that cyber-security is truly a pub-
lic good. Quite the opposite: the type of security that
emerges mainly benefits a few and already powerful en-
tities and has no, or even negative effects for the rest’.
The content of security—what cybersecurity and critical
infrastructure protection is for—is the reproduction of a
specific liberal political economy.
In the United States, for example, cybersecurity and
critical infrastructure protection directly benefits the ma-
terial interests of the large firms that participate in, for ex-
ample, the Department of Homeland Security’s Critical In-
frastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) (United
States Department of Homeland Security, 2017). The lev-
els of wealth found among the private sector partners
of cybersecurity are substantial: Google’s Sergy Brin and
Larry Page areworth approximately $23billion each (Dyer-
Witherford, 2015), while Bill Gates net-worth is some
$90 billion dollars (Kroll & Dolan, 2017). Dyer-Witherford
(2015, pp. 141–142) draws attention to the larger struc-
tural impact of cybersecurity policy when he highlights
the place of ICTs in contemporary capitalist order, arguing
that ‘this is not the most important measure of the im-
portance of cybernetics to capital…The real significance
of ICT capital is what it has done for capital in general’.
The share of national income going to labour has declined
in tandem with the diffusion of information technologies
throughout the American economy. ICTs have enabled
increased levels of automation, the downsizing and out-
sourcing of manufacturing industry, and the creation of
a vast surplus of unemployed and underemployed work-
ers in the United States economy, all undermining the bar-
gaining power of unions (Kristal, 2013; Rotman, 2014). Job
market insecurity and precarity characterize this techno-
logically underpinned settlement. Cybersecurity and crit-
ical infrastructure protection policies aim to reproduce
the process of ‘class-biased technological change’ (Kristal,
2013), designed to protect intellectual property and to en-
able market-led technological innovation. The provision
of this public good secures and reproduces the unequal
distribution of income in American society based upon
property ownership. That cybersecurity is a public good
does not mean its benefits are equally distributed; this is
not what liberal cybersecurity is for.
5. Cybersecurity and the Privatization of Political Power
Securing IPRs facilitates the reproduction of contempo-
rary high technology capitalism, with its attendant con-
sequences for the unequal distribution of wealth. The re-
production of the division between the public and the
private is equally important for determining how differ-
ent forms of social power are, or are not, made account-
able to the public. Public and private power within lib-
eral societies substantively maps onto the institutional
separation between the political and the economic that
characterizes capitalism. As Wood (1981) notes, the in-
terlinked division between the public, private, political,
and economic, effectively privatized what had previously
been constituted as public political power. Pre-capitalist
social formations united political power and economic
appropriation—the right to appropriate the output of
others depended on one’s political position in society.
Under capitalism, by contrast, the right to appropriate
the wealth of others is divorced from political roles;
when politicians use their office for private economic
gain this is identified as corruption and punished. Eco-
nomic actors have the right to goods produced by virtue
of private property ownership. Capitalism privatizes a
form of social power previously considered ‘political’,
and thereby subject to norms of accountability.
This takes two forms. First, it confers onto capital-
ists the right to direct and organize the labour process.
Private property rights, underwritten by the judicial and
coercive apparatus of the state and reproduced, in the
context of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure pro-
tection, through the cooperation of PPPs, give firms the
right, and ability, to direct the activity of others. Cap-
italists exercise significant power in shaping the every-
day lives of their employees—they decide how prod-
ucts (including software) will be produced, allocate re-
sources including labour, set work targets, organize the
process of production, and oversee the production pro-
cess in general.
Second, and most significantly for our purposes, se-
curing private property rights via cybersecurity PPPs se-
cures the right of private actors to direct the design and
development of new hardware and software infrastruc-
tures as they see fit. This enables the continuation of
market-led technological innovation, a significant source
of social power. Technological infrastructures are thema-
terialization of the norms and values of their designers.
In Andrew Feenberg’s (1991, p. 14) terms, ‘it stands at
the intersection between ideology and technique where
the two come together to control human beings and re-
sources’. Conferring this right on private actors allows
them to shape political orders in the long-term, as the
path dependency of technology structures social life. For,
in this infrastructure, the United States government is
not merely talking about the security of its economy, its
military and defence, or its critical public infrastructure.
Increasingly, what is being secured is the way of life of
Americans themselves in their full digital articulation.
When the privatization of political power is consid-
ered in these terms, the concerns over the role of the
private sector in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure
protection via PPPs is complicated. As clear lines of ac-
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countability are demanded of the private sector partici-
pation in public sector functions, it is possible to press
this further to ask how and why boundaries around pri-
vate sector accountability for the development of infras-
tructures, within the scope of their authority in the mar-
ket, are set and maintained.
6. Conclusion
Taking the full measure of cybersecurity and critical in-
frastructure protection policies requires analysis of their
place in reproducing specific forms of political order. Re-
orienting our conceptual lenses to consider the deeper
political theory within which security thinking is rooted
is one small step in this direction. A range of theoreti-
cal positions are compatible with this aim. While the ap-
proach favoured here is rooted in Critical Theory and his-
torical materialism, this does not exhaust a programme
of ‘deepening’ cybersecurity studies. Asking for a deeper
analysis is merely a request to clarify the foundational as-
sumptions that shape our inquiries. Cybersecurity stud-
ies informed by a plurality of theoretical frameworks can
only be a positive development.
Nevertheless, the analysis presented above favours
Critical Theory as the most fruitful way to pursue this
project. Space prevents a full discussion its epistemolog-
ical, ontological, and methodological dimensions; three
central claims will suffice. First, Critical Theory is interdis-
ciplinary in nature. As we know, cybersecurity is a com-
plex and multifaceted issue. While no single study could
possibly capture this complexity, a research programme
attending to the breadth of its varied aspects—the politi-
cal economy of cybersecurity, its normative suppositions
and impact, the discursive representations that inform
and support these—can provide a more comprehensive
reconstruction of the challenge of cybersecurity.
Second, Critical Theory (tempered by historical ma-
terialism) is historically sensitive. Recognizing the public-
private divide as an historically produced outcome of
liberal orders opens our conceptual and political hori-
zons. In turn, it emphasizes how structural pressures,
such as those imposed by markets, condition forms of
power available to various social forces in specific con-
texts. To this extent, the analysis above cannot be easily
generalized to non-liberal societies. Indeed, the use of cy-
bersecurity PPPs to meet broader political aims may be
pursued quite differently in different contexts. The nor-
mative commitment to PPPs in the United States, with
the ideological weight around property and liberty that
underpins them, may differ substantially from a merely
instrumental use in non-liberal states. Stressing an his-
torical understanding allows for nuanced treatment of
how various social forces—in liberal and illiberal states—
shape the plurality of approaches to cybersecurity we
witness in world politics.
Finally, Critical Theory draws attention to the ques-
tion that implicitly structures the concerns over private
sector accountability in the literature: democracy. Fear
of unaccountable power is central to existing criticism of
cybersecurity PPPs. As a normative aim, a Critical Theory
approach to cybersecurity is committed to the democra-
tization science and technology as a vehicle for greater
social and political equality. To give just one example,
greater democratic participation in defining how cyber-
security risks are determined, proceeding along the lines
of similar consultative exercises around food standards
in the United Kingdom (Jasanoff, 2003, pp. 237–238),
could provide a different account of how cybersecurity
risks are defined and to whose benefit. Answering the
question of what cybersecurity is both an analytical task
and a practical question in need of democratically de-
rived answers.
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